But Arnold will veto because he wanst “to let judges sort out the legality of gay marriage.” Our Republican boy-wonder is in favor of legislating from the bench? Who knew?
Crash and burn, Arnold. Crash and burn.
But Arnold will veto because he wanst “to let judges sort out the legality of gay marriage.” Our Republican boy-wonder is in favor of legislating from the bench? Who knew?
Crash and burn, Arnold. Crash and burn.
Arnold is simply preserving the ability of his talking airheads to rail about judicial activism on the issue of same sex marriage.
That being said, this is one of those areas in which it’s hard to choose between democratically granting such rights through legislation and judicially “discovering” such rights in constitutional interpretation. The problem with statutes, and the reason why “civil unions” are a problem, is that statutes can be revoked or altered in a way to which constitutions are less susceptible.
As an example, if the U.S. Congress had passed a statute in 1954 stating that “no school or other educational facility receiving funds from any State or from the United States shall deny admission to any person on the grounds of race,” that statute could be revoked in the future. (Ignoring for the moment whether this would have been a valid exercise of federal power – I think it would have under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that’s one of those ephemeral debates.) Finding that “separate but equal” had no constitutional footing made the end of legal segregation permanent in a way a legislative pronouncement would not.
However, in the case of equal rights for same sex partners, an argument can be made that legislation is a better alternative because it reflects the mandate of a democratically accountable body on an issue that arouses a great deal of passion.
So it’s a choice – short-term legitimacy at the risk of possible reversal of course in the long-term, or short-term arguable illegitimacy in exchange for longer-term stability.